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Private consumption is the most important component of aggregate demand. Nevertheless,
modelling consumption behavior is still a challenge to the economics profession. Under-
standing consumption is essential for constructing meaningful macroeconometric forecast-
ing models, as well as for evaluating the eﬀects of key ﬁscal and monetary policies.
One of the lasting contributions to modern day consumer theory is the idea that con-
sumption is determined by the expected value of lifetime resources or permanent income,
known as the life cycle-permanent income hypothesis model (LC-PIH).1 The modern-day
speciﬁcation of this fundamental concept involves an intertemporal choice model with
quadratic preferences, stochastic labor income, no borrowing restrictions, and perfect fore-
sight. In spite of its intuitive appeal, several inﬂuential papers reveal discrepancies between
this model’s predictions and the aggregate data. On the one hand, Hall’s (1978) paper
surprised the profession by demonstrating that under simple assumptions, consumption is
a martingale; i.e., a regression of period t consumption growth on any variable known at
period t − 1 should return an estimate of zero. Regressions using aggregate data, how-
ever, consistently return an estimate signiﬁcantly larger than zero when current growth
in consumption is regressed on lagged aggregate income growth—a phenomenon known
as “excess sensitivity” (of current consumption to lagged income).2 On the other hand,
the LC-PIH model also predicts that if the income process exhibits high persistence, cur-
rent consumption should respond strongly to unanticipated innovations. Empirical work
using aggregate data consistently ﬁnds a small reaction of consumption to current income
shocks—a phenomenon known as “excess smoothness”.3
The buﬀer-stock model of saving, pioneered by Deaton (1991) and Carroll (1997), is a
promising candidate for replacing the LC-PIH model as the benchmark model of consumer
behavior. This model, while still preserving many of the insights stemming from rational
forward-looking behavior, assumes individuals cannot (or endogenously will not) borrow
and allows consumers to be more prudent and less patient than in Hall (1978). Over
the last decade, a large body of literature has shown that the buﬀer-stock model can
explain several aspects of household spending decisions. However, at the aggregate level,
the implications of the buﬀer-stock model are not as well explored, and in some cases,
1This idea was pioneered by Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and Friedman (1957).
2For studies of excess sensitivity, see Flavin (1981), Blinder and Deaton (1985), and Campbell and
Deaton (1989).
3Campbell and Mankiw (1987) and Cochrane (1988), among others, document that innovations to GNP
are highly persistent. Building on the results in Hansen and Sargent (1981), excess smoothness has been
documented by Deaton (1987), Campbell and Deaton (1989), and Gal´ ı (1991).
1not fully satisfactory. Ludvigson and Michaelides (2001) show—in a careful and explicit
aggregation of the buﬀer-stock model—that the model cannot generate robust excesses.
Instead, the authors rely on incomplete information as in Pischke (1995) to generate some
excesses. Similarly, Michaelides (2001) needs habit formation to generate the excesses
observed in the aggregate data.
We believe one main shortcoming of most consumption models, including the standard
buﬀer-stock model, is that they traditionally focus solely on the study of nondurable con-
sumption.4 In this paper, we present a generalized buﬀer-stock model with durables and
nondurables that can explain the excess sensitivity and excess smoothness of nondurable
consumption observed in the aggregate data without the need for incomplete information.
Introducing durable goods into this framework is not straightforward and can be done
in several diﬀerent ways. In our speciﬁcation, we assume individuals derive utility from
consumption of a nondurable good and from the services provided by a durable good.
Moreover, the durable good can act as collateral for credit purchases. In particular, the
durable can be ﬁnanced minus a down payment, and durable equity loans, with a certain
maximum loan-to-value ratio, are available to consumers. Collateralized constraints of this
type impose distortions on the allocation of consumption across time and across goods,
even with a utility function separable in both goods.5 We also take into account the
fact that the market for durables may be characterized by important transaction costs.
We consider non-convex costs of adjustment as in Grossman and Laroque (1990), which
generate large and infrequent adjustments, in a (S,s) rule fashion.6 In all other respects,
our model is identical to the classic buﬀer-stock framework.
The use of a collateralized constraint should not be controversial. First, according to the
Federal Reserve Board’s 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), collateral borrowing,
mainly obtained to purchase housing and automobiles, is the principal type of borrowing
undertaken by households.7 Second, considering this constraint allows us to study an extra
motive for savings: saving for down payments. Down payments represent a large ﬁnancial
burden for most households. For example, according to the annual survey of home buyers
4Notable exceptions are Caballero (1993) and Eberly (1994) who focus on durables, and Chah, Ramey,
and Starr (1995), Alessie, Devereux, and Weber (1997), Carroll and Dunn (1997), Dunn (1998) and Flavin
and Nakagawa (2004), who consider models with both durables and nodurables.
5Even without collateralized liquidity constraints, the interactions between durable and nondurable
goods are interesting. Browning and Crossley (1997) show that individuals who face limited borrowing
alternatives smooth out ﬂuctuations in income by postponing the replacement of small durables.
6See Attanasio (1998) for more references and an insightful discussion of models with lumpy adjustment.
7In the 1998 SCF, 92 percent of all available credit to households is for the purchase of houses and auto-
mobiles (collateral credit). Moreover, the average ratio of collateral credit to total debt across households
is roughly 79 percent.
2Who’s Buying Homes in America?, households must save, on average, for two and a half
years to buy their ﬁrst home.8 Moreover, by changing down payment requirements, our
model can be used to study certain implications of ﬁnancial liberalization.
It is important to acknowledge that a very similar formulation of the problem with-
out adjustment costs has been explored by Chah, Ramey, and Starr (1995) and Alessie,
Devereux, and Weber (1997). However, the focus of these papers is empirical. Carroll
and Dunn (1997) present a similar model with adjustment costs but focus on the role of
unemployment expectations on consumption spending decisions. To our knowledge, this
particular version of the model has not yet been solved. We show that with a combination
of the right numerical dynamic programming techniques, the curse of dimensionality and
the complications that the illiquidity of the durable poses can be overcome, and reason-
able parameterizations of the model can be solved accurately. In particular, we use Euler
equation iteration for a version of the model with no adjustment costs in the durable mar-
ket, and a ﬁnite state approximation method for the version with adjustment costs. Both
techniques are brieﬂy discussed and compared.
After solving the model, we characterize the optimal consumption rules for an indi-
vidual consumer under diﬀerent down payment regimes. We then simulate individual
and aggregate consumption series—calculated through explicit aggregation—and study
the implications of diﬀerent down payments for consumption patterns. Finally, we explore
whether a plausible parametrization of the model can account for the excess sensitivity
and excess smoothness observed in the aggregate data for nondurable consumption.
At the individual level, we ﬁnd that nondurable consumption is smoother relative to
income when down payment requirements are high for two diﬀerent reasons. First, when
income is transitorily low, a buﬀer-stock consumer on occasion liquidates the equity ac-
cumulated in the durable to prop up his nondurable consumption. Since higher required
down payments translate into higher levels of equity, nondurable consumption becomes
smoother. Second, when an individual experiences a positive permanent income shock,
he chooses not to fully adjust his consumption due to the desire to spread out the cost of
accumulating a down payment. The implications for the durable are slightly more complex
and are thoroughly discussed throughout the paper.
At the aggregate level, nondurable consumption is also smoother for higher down pay-
ments. The result follows from a gradual adjustment of consumption due to the desire
8See Chicago Title and Trust (1995). For ﬁrst-time buyers, the majority of the required down payment
comes from savings (74.8 percent). For repeat buyers, savings are supplemented by the proceeds from the
existing house sale (52.2 percent from savings and 31.7 percent from the sale of the previous home).
3to spread out the cost of the down payment, not the higher equity levels associated with
higher down payments. At the aggregate level, all individual-speciﬁc shocks cancel out
and what remains is the eﬀect of aggregate shocks, which we model as permanent. The
sluggish response of consumption to changes in income can generate robust excesses for
reasonable parameter values, especially in the presence of transaction costs.
In other words, with lower down payments, consumption becomes more volatile relative
to income and excess sensitivity weakens.9 This implication is consistent with the inter-
national empirical evidence in Japelli and Pagano (1989) who ﬁnd that down payment
requirements are highly correlated with excess sensitivity. Furthermore, Bacchetta and
Gerlach (1997) ﬁnd that excess sensitivity varies over time with a clear tendency to decline
in U.S. aggregate data. More recently, Peersman and Pozzi (2004) show an inverse rela-
tion between excess sensitivity coeﬃcients and measures of ﬁnancial liberalization in U.S.
aggregate data. Both ﬁndings are also consistent with our model. A further interesting
implication of the model is that average wealth holdings decrease with decreases in down
payments or transaction costs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Sec-
tion 3 describes the solution method, the calibration, as well as the optimal policy functions
for nondurable and durable consumption. In Section 4, we discuss the implications of the
model on consumption patterns for both an individual household and for the aggregate.
Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
2 The Basic Model
The consumer’s problem is to maximize the present discounted value of expected utility
from consumption of a nondurable good, Ct, and from the service ﬂow provided by a
durable good, Kt,w h e r et denotes time. We assume that time is discrete and agents face
an inﬁnite horizon. β<1 is the discount factor.10
9This prediction is not inconsistent with the evidence that consumption volatility and output volatility
decrease with ﬁnancial development as documented in Denizer, Iyigun, and Owen (2002). Our model pre-
dicts increases in the volatility of consumption relative to the volatility of income. If ﬁnancial liberalization
reduces the volatility of income, the absolute volatility of consumption decreases in our model as well.
10Note the simplifying assumption that an agent’s service ﬂow from the durable is proportional to the
durable stock. Furthermore, we set the constant of proportionality equal to one. This simpliﬁcation is
used by many others. See, for example, Mankiw (1982) and Chah, Ramey, and Starr (1995). A slightly
more realistic setup would express utility as a function of the service ﬂows derived from the durable stock.























where ϕ is a preference parameter.11 Note that ρ>0 implies that the agent is risk-averse
and has a precautionary motive for saving.
This maximization is subject to both a budget constraint and a wealth constraint.
Assume there is one riskless ﬁnancial asset, At. R is the interest factor paid on it. In
period t, an agent holds past ﬁnancial assets gross of interest, RAt−1, and receives Yt units
of income. In the same period, the agent chooses nondurable consumption, Ct, and net
investment on the durable, (Kt − ψKt−1), where ψ is the depreciation factor. Moreover,
the agent may be subject to an adjustment cost, ζ(Kt,K t−1), when changing the durable
stock. The budget constraint between two successive periods is given by:
At = RAt−1 + Yt − Ct − (Kt − ψKt−1) − ζ(Kt,K t−1) . (3)
Labor income is assumed to be exogenous to the agent and stochastic, and is the only
source of uncertainty in the model. We assume, as in Ludvigson and Michaelides (2001)
and similar to Carroll (1997), that labor income, Yt, is the product of permanent income,
Pt, and an idiosyncratic transitory shock, Tt: Yt = PtTt. In turn, permanent income is
Pt = GtPt−1Nt. Gt can be thought of as the growth in permanent income attributable
to aggregate productivity growth in the economy which is common to all agents. Nt
is a permanent idiosyncratic shock. We assume lnGt,l n Tt,a n dl n Nt are independent




N respectively. This income speciﬁcation is particularly useful since it allows for
consumers to share in general growth while the variance of their income can be calibrated
to be dominated by idiosyncratic permanent or transitory components. The speciﬁcation
implies that the growth rate of individual labor income follows an MA(1) process, ∆lnYt =
lnGt +l nNt +l nTt − lnTt−1, which is consistent with the microeconomic evidence.12 By
11We follow Bernanke (1984) who studies the joint behavior of the consumption of durable and non-




12See the discussion in Ludvigson and Michaelides (2001) on how empirical studies such as MaCurdy
(1982), Abowd and Card (1989), and Pischke (1995) ﬁnd that an MA(1) in the growth rate of income is
5the law of large numbers, aggregate income, ¯ Yt, follows the process, ∆ln ¯ Yt =l nGt+0.5σ2
N,
where ¯ Yt =1 /n
 n
i=1 Yit, i =1 ,...,n.
A very important aspect of the model is the collateralized constraint imposed on the
agent:
At +( 1− θ)Kt ≥ 0 , (4)
with θ ∈ [0,1]. This constraint implies that an individual’s borrowing limit is a fraction
(1−θ) of the durable stock. The constraint summarizes several commonly observed aspects
of collateral lending. A household can only ﬁnance a fraction (1−θ) of durable purchases.
In other words, it must satisfy a down payment requirement θ. The constraint also implies
that when a household owns a durable good, it can obtain a durable equity loan with a
maximum loan-to-value ratio (1 − θ). In summary, at any point in time, an agent is only
required to keep an accumulated durable equity, θKt. Note that total wealth, At+Kt,c a n
be divided into a required down payment (required equity or required wealth), θKt,a n dt h e
wealth held in excess of the required down payment or voluntary equity, Qt ≡ At+(1−θ)Kt.
Also, the consumer can increase nondurable consumption by decreasing either voluntary
or required equity. However, accessing required equity implies changing the durable stock,
which may be costly if adjustment costs are present. Finally, this collateralized constraint
does not imply a ﬁxed borrowing limit but a limit that varies with the durable stock and
θ.13
3 Solving the Model
A closed-form solution of the model does not exist and we must rely on computational
methods to solve the consumer’s problem. This section presents our computational strategy
as well as some qualitative implications of the solution. We ﬁrst solve the model with no
adjustment costs to understand the role of durability and the collateralized constraint. We
then add non-convex adjustment costs to incorporate irreversibility and infrequent changes
in durable purchases.
a good approximation to models estimated on microeconomic data.
13The standard-buﬀer stock model can be easily extended to allow for a ﬁxed borrowing limit. Ludvigson
(1999) studies a buﬀer-stock model of saving with time varying liquidity-constraints, where credit varies
stochastically with income.
63.1 No Adjustment Costs
Euler equation iteration has been the traditional approach for solving microeconomic dy-
namic stochastic optimization problems with nondurable consumption only. We generalize
the algorithm in Carroll (1997) and Deaton (1991) to accommodate multiple goods and
the collateralized constraint considered here. We reformulate the model to facilitate the
implementation of this numerical technique.
Reformulating the Model
Deﬁne cash-on-hand, Xt,a sXt ≡ RAt−1 + ψKt−1 + Yt. Note that durable wealth
can be lumped together with ﬁnancial resources and labor income because we assume for
now that there are no costs of adjusting the durable stock. The budget constraint becomes
At = Xt−Ct−Kt and the collateralized constraint Ct+θKt ≤ Xt. Combining the deﬁnition
of cash-on-hand and the budget constraint, we can write an expression for the evolution




C = βR Et[U
t+1
C ]+λt , (5)
U
t
K = β(R − ψ)E t[U
t+1
C ]+θλt , (6)
λt(Xt − Ct − θKt)=0. (7)
Equation (5) states that the marginal utility of nondurable consumption in period t must
equal the discounted expected marginal utility of nondurable consumption in period t+1,
plus the shadow price of the constraint. Analogously, equation (6) states that the marginal
utility of durable consumption in period t must be equal to the expected marginal utility
of nondurable consumption in period t + 1 discounted by β(R − ψ), plus θ times the
shadow price of the constraint. Note the diﬀerence in the discount factor from the above
equation—βR versus β(R − ψ)—because of the durability of K.A l s o ,λt is multiplied by
θ to reﬂect the fact that only a down payment is required as payment for the durable in
period t.
Equations (5) and (6) are intertemporal conditions. Solving for βEt[U
t+1
C ]i ne q u a -
tion (5) and plugging it into equation (6), we obtain an equation for the intratemporal















7When the liquidity constraint is not binding, λt = 0. In this particular case, given our












This is the optimal relationship between Ct and Kt accounting for durability.14 (R−ψ)/R
is known in the literature as the user cost of the durable. This cost represents the single-
period cost, or rental equivalent cost of one durable unit. It is aﬀected by the depreciation
factor and the interest rate.15 When the agent is not constrained, the trade-oﬀ between Ct
and Kt is fully captured by the user cost and the preference parameter. For constrained
agents, other factors come into play. If Kt is poor collateral (θ is higher than the user
cost), constrained agents let durable consumption fall temporarily and vice versa.N o t e
that when θ =( R−ψ)/R, the trade-oﬀ between Ct and Kt is determined only by the user
cost, even if the constraint is binding. This is a particularly useful benchmark case since
the constraint does not impose any distortions in the intratemporal allocation between the
two goods.16
In order to deal with the nonstationarity of income, we normalize all variables by
permanent income, Pt, as proposed by Carroll (1997). Lower-case variables denote upper-
case counterparts divided by permanent income. The Euler-Lagrange equations can be

















  −ρ 
−c
−ρ
t =0 . (10)
14If ϕ =1a n dψ is 0 (i.e. the durable depreciates completely after one period), Ut
C = Ut
K. That is, the
agent would choose to consume the same amounts of both goods (Ct = Kt). If ψ>0, Ct <K t.
15Depreciation erodes the agent’s investment in the durable and eﬀectively increases the cost. The
interest rate also increases the user cost as it reﬂects the opportunity cost of investing in the durable: a
dollar invested in the durable could have returned R − 1 dollars if invested in ﬁnancial assets. We ignore
other factors, such as capital gains and losses on the durable. A more general speciﬁcation for the user
cost would be (PK
t R − PK
t+1 ψ)/(PK
t R).
16Note also that equations (5) and (8) imply that:
RβEt[U
t+1















The change in marginal utility between two successive periods is not white noise. This interesting implica-
tion of the model was used by Chah, Ramey, and Starr (1995) to empirically study the excess sensitivity
of consumption.
8When the agent is constrained:



















Equations (10) and (11) can be solved to obtain a policy function for normalized non-
durable consumption as a function of the only state variable, normalized cash-on-hand,
c(x). Once we ﬁnd the policy function for nondurable consumption, the policy function
for durable consumption, k(x), can be calculated by using the intratemporal relationship
between the two goods. Appendix A.1 presents further details, including convergence
conditions.
The Policy Functions
We now describe the shape of the optimal consumption functions for normalized non-
durable and durable consumption. In order to compare our ﬁndings with the previous
literature, we start by adding up ct to θkt. The policy function for this variable is depicted
in Figure 1, panel A. Similar to Deaton (1991), there is a unique x∗(θ) such that:




x, x ≤ x∗(θ),
<x , x>x ∗(θ).
If normalized cash-on-hand this period, xt, is below a threshold level, x∗(θ), the agent is
constrained and all resources are exhausted after paying for nondurable consumption and
the down payment requirement. In other words, no normalized voluntary equity is carried
over to the next period, qt ≡ at +( 1− θ)kt=0. If cash-on-hand is higher than x∗(θ), some
voluntary equity is accumulated, qt > 0. Note that the higher θ is, the higher the required
level of equity an agent must keep. As a result, the threshold x∗(θ) is an increasing function
of θ (see Figure 1, panel B).
[Figure 1]
How are resources are allocated between the two goods? Propositions 1 and 2 summarize
our ﬁndings. Proofs are presented in Appendix A.3.
9Proposition 1
When an agent is not constrained, x>x ∗(θ), c(x)= Ω
Ω+θ (x−q),a n dk(x)= 1
Ω+θ (x−
q), regardless of the value of θ.
Proposition 1 states that when the agent is not constrained and once he has made
the decision regarding how much voluntary equity to bring to the next period, the agent
spends ﬁxed proportions of the remaining cash-on-hand between the two goods.
Proposition 2
When an agent is constrained, x ≤ x∗(θ),






(B) If the down payment parameter is lower than the user cost, θ<
R−ψ
R , c(x) is a convex
function of x,a n dk(x) is a concave function of x.
(C) If the down payment parameter is equal to the user cost, θ =
R−ψ
R , c(x) and k(x) are








(D) If the down payment parameter is higher than the user cost,
R−ψ
R <θ≤ 1, c(x) is a
concave function of x,a n dk(x) is a convex function of x.
Proposition 2 describes, for the case when the agent is constrained, the shapes of the
policy functions which depend on the credit conditions characterized by the relationship
between the down payment parameter and the user cost.
[Figure 2]
Figure 2 illustrates the propositions by depicting the policy rules for the four parameter
regions described in Proposition 2. There are important diﬀerences in the consumption
functions. For a constrained agent, the policy function for the durable good becomes
“ﬂatter” as the down payment requirement gets lower. The opposite is true for nondurable
consumption. This implies that for a level of normalized cash-on-hand such that the agent
is constrained in all regimes, the marginal propensity to consume the nondurable good out
10of cash-on-hand is higher the lower θ (in fact, it is exactly one when θ =0 ) .T h es h a p e s
suggest, therefore, higher nondurable volatility and lower durable volatility for regimes
with lower down payments but do not prove it. First, x is endogenous, and second, as θ
gets higher, agents are more likely to be constrained for a given level of x. Whether or not
nondurable (durable) consumption indeed becomes more (less) volatile relative to income
with decreasing down payments needs to be veriﬁed through simulation.
3.2 Adjustment costs
After gaining some understanding of the role of the collateralized constraint, we incorporate
transaction costs in the durables market. Durables are typically purchased in large lumpy
increments and changed only infrequently. Bar-Ilan and Blinder (1992), Caballero (1993),
Bertola and Caballero (1990), and Eberly (1994) argue that optimal consumption rules
for durables can be described as following an (S,s) rule. When the stock of a durable
good falls below some lower bound s, a purchase is made and the stock is readjusted to
a target size S. As long as the stock of the durable good remains above the trigger point
s, no action is taken. Non-convex costs of adjustment generate (S,s) patterns and thus
we choose a non-convex cost speciﬁcation in our model. In particular we use a similar
speciﬁcation to Grossman and Laroque (1990):
ζ(Kt,K t−1)=φdψKt−1,
where φ is the adjustment cost parameter and d is a dummy variable which takes on the
value of zero when there is no investment, Kt − ψKt−1 = 0, and one otherwise. This
adjustment cost can be seen as a proportional loss in the selling price of the agent’s prior
holdings of the durable stock. This loss in price can be attributable to any type of cost
incurred upon sale, such as the payment of taxes, a sales commission, or an imperfection
in the resale market for the durable.17 Note that once the agent has decided to adjust his
durable holdings, the adjustment cost is ﬁxed from his perspective; the cost is proportional
to the inherited level of the durable stock, ψKt−1.18 In this formulation, the transaction
cost does not diminish in importance as households become wealthier, as with a purely
17See Lam (1989) for an analysis of the aggregate implications of the time series properties of durable
expenditure when the irreversibility of incremental adjustment of the durable is due to resale market
imperfections.
18In this speciﬁcation the adjustment cost is paid by the seller. Alternatively, we could divide the cost
between buyer and seller: ζ(Kt,K t−1)=φ1dψKt−1 + φ2dKt. Then, the eﬀective payment paid by a
consumer when purchasing the durable would be θ + φ2. In order to keep the eﬀects of down payments
separate from the eﬀects of adjustment costs, we choose the ﬁrst speciﬁcation.
11ﬁxed cost. This speciﬁcation also implies that incremental adjustments do not occur (i.e.
the agent must sell his entire existing stock upon adjustment).19
Technically, adding adjustment costs is not a trivial modiﬁcation. We cannot use Euler
equation iteration to solve the model because of non-diﬀerentiability issues. Thus, we
apply a diﬀerent numerical dynamic programming technique, a ﬁnite state approximation
method. In order to apply this technique, we must use an alternative reformulation of the
model in terms of voluntary equity and the durable stock.
Given the adjustment cost, ﬁnancial assets, At, evolve according to:
At = RAt−1 − (Kt − ψ (1 − dφ)Kt−1)+Yt − Ct . (12)
The evolution of voluntary equity is given by:
Qt ≡ At +( 1− θ)Kt
= RAt−1 − (Kt − ψ(1 − dφ)Kt−1)+Yt − Ct +( 1− θ)Kt
+ R(1 − θ)Kt−1 − R(1 − θ)Kt−1
= RQt−1 +[ ψ(1 − dφ) − R(1 − θ)]Kt−1 − θKt + Yt − Ct . (13)
The constraint becomes Qt ≥ 0, ∀t. In order to deal with the nonstationarity of income,
we normalize all variables by permanent income. Then, we use the homogeneity of degree












Rqt−1 +[ ψ(1 − dφ) − R(1 − θ)]kt−1
 
−θkt + Vt − qt,k t
 
+ V (qt,k t)
 
. (14)
The solution technique consists of specifying and solving a ﬁnite-state problem that
approximates the continuous one presented above. Note that under this formulation, the
control variables (qt, kt) are also next period’s states. These continuous variables can be
approximated by ﬁnite discrete sets. Moreover, the speciﬁcation allows for a straightfor-
ward incorporation of the liquidity constraint and the adjustment cost. The discretely
19This is more reasonable if K represents a single durable good (i.e. a house) than if K represents
composite good.
12approximated problem is solved using value function iteration combined with an accelera-
tion technique, modiﬁed policy function iteration, as explained in Appendix A.2.
Adding adjustment costs obviously changes the policy functions for durables. Also, the
role of durables as a substitute for a liquid buﬀer-stock of saving is diminished since selling
durables to recover required equity is costly. In order to fully understand the eﬀect that
down payment requirements and transaction costs have on consumption behavior, we solve
both versions of the model numerically and calculate several consumption statistics for both
nondurable and durable goods under diﬀerent down payment regimes (diﬀerent θs), with
and without adjustment costs. A numerical solution requires appropriate calibration of
the model’s parameters, which we now describe.
3.3 Calibration
We use an annual horizon as most microeconomic evidence for the parameters that we must
calibrate comes from studies of annual data. We set the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient to
2, ρ = 2. The rate of time preference is 0.05—β =1 /1.05— and the net real interest rate
equals 2 percent, R =1 .02. The income shocks parameters are as follows: µG =0 .02, µN =
µT =0 ,σG =0 .025, σN =0 .05, and σT =0 .07. All values are similar to Ludvigson and
Michaelides (2001), whose results we compare to ours.20 The adjustment cost parameter,
φ, is 0 in the non-adjustment cost case and 5 percent in the adjustment cost case.
ψ, the depreciation factor, is set to 0.915, implying an annual depreciation rate of 8.5
percent. We obtain this number by combining data from the National Income and Product
Accounts (NIPA) and the Fixed Assets and Consumer Durable Goods Accounts (FACD)
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis for the years 1959–2001. We interpret durables,
K, in a comprehensive manner as the sum of residential stocks and all consumer durable
goods. Accordingly, investment on durables, I, is calculated as expenditure on consumer
durables plus residential private domestic investment. We assume the U.S. is in a steady
state and calculate the real, average ratio of investment on durables to the durable stock,
which determines the depreciation rate: 1 − ψ = I/K.21
We need to calibrate one last parameter, ϕ, the preference parameter in the utility
function. We proceed as follows. First, we ﬁnd the ratio of real nondurable consumption
20In fact, these parameter values correspond to one of Ludvigson and Michaelides’s (2001) worst per-
forming scenarios for the standard buﬀer-stock model of saving. Results are robust to small variations of
the parameters, which we do not tabulate here for brevity.
21In the steady state, ∆K = I − (1 − ψ)K = 0 which implies 1 − ψ = I/K.
13to the durable stock (C/K) using NIPA and FACD, which is 0.36.22 We know that when












Given the values of ρ, R, ψ and C/K,w eo b t a i nϕ =0 .795. We use this number for our
individual consumption simulations and let the C/K ratio vary accordingly to illustrate
t h ee ﬀ e c t so fac h a n g i n gθ on the ratio. For the aggregate consumption simulations, ϕ
is adjusted to keep the ratio C/K constant and equal to 0.36 under the diﬀerent down
payment regimes.
In our simulations, the down payment parameter, θ, is set free for two reasons. First,
our durable good is a composite of very diﬀerent commodities: houses, cars, furniture,
etc. θ is the down payment parameter and (1 − θ) is the maximum loan-to-value ratio for
durable equity loans. Not only are down payments likely to be diﬀerent for the diﬀerent
categories, but while home equity loans are widely available, other durable equity loans at
favorable rates are not as common. Second, certain aspects of the collateralized constraint
we consider in this paper deviate from ﬁnancial contracts written in reality. Mainly, in order
to keep the model tractable, the down payment parameter is the same for all consumers and
the borrowing rate is not a function of θ.23 Therefore, it is not obvious what the right value
for θ should be. Since for our sample period, houses represent 82 percent of the total durable
stock in FADC data, we could argue then for values close to down payments for houses.
According to the Federal Housing Finance Board (FHFB), the average down payment for
the period 1963–2001 is 25 percent. In fact, less than 33 percent of homeowners put down
less than 20 percent. However, we anticipate that in order to quantitatively account for
the excess sensitivity and excess smoothness of consumption in aggregate data, we require
a suﬃcient wedge between the user cost and the down payment parameter. Given our
parameter choices, the user cost of the durable, (R − ψ)/R, is roughly 10 percent and we
need down payments higher than this value to match the aggregate excesses.24
22C is deﬁned as the sum of nondurable consumption plus services minus housing, and K as the sum of
the private residential stock plus the stock of consumer durables. We keep shoes and clothing within the
nondurable category since in this framework it is not appropriate to model them as durables. The results
of the paper do not change signiﬁcantly if these are ignored or treated as durables.
23In addition to the collateral requirement, lenders impose several additional criteria to reduce the
likelihood of default. For housing, some lenders require that the mortgage payment does not exceed some
percentage of current income. Another standard condition requires the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) to be
below a certain threshold. Otherwise, the borrower faces higher marginal borrowing costs, including a
higher interest rate and the purchase of mortgage insurance.
24In this paper, we abstract from house price appreciation which would reduce the user cost. If this
14We use the parameters above to compute individual optimal policy rules for normalized
nondurable and durable consumption. Next, we generate labor income shocks from the
assumed distribution of idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks for 200 periods. Given the
optimal policy rules and the simulated income realizations, we calculate nondurable and
durable consumption (for that number of periods) for several individuals. In order to
explore both the microeconomic and macroeconomic implications of the model, we run
two diﬀerent sets of simulations. For the individual results, we compute relevant statistics
for each individual time series (i.e. consumption growth, volatility of consumption, etc.),
reporting the average of these statistics across several consumers. For the aggregate results,
ﬁrst, we calculate a time series of aggregate consumption and aggregate income as the
average of individual consumption and income across consumers, and then compute the
relevant statistics (i.e. we aggregate explicitly).
4 Implication of Changing Down Payments
4.1 Individual Consumption
Table 1 summarizes several microeconomic consumption statistics for diﬀerent down pay-
ment regimes. We report average consumption growth, as well as excess sensitivity and
excess smoothness coeﬃcients for both nondurable and durable consumption. The excess
smoothness coeﬃcient is calculated as the ratio of the standard deviation of consumption
growth to that of income growth. It is therefore a measure of the relative volatility of
consumption.25 The excess sensitivity ﬁgure is the OLS coeﬃcient from a regression of
consumption growth on lagged income growth and a constant. It is one of the possible
measures on how consumption growth reacts to predictable income changes. These statis-
tics are computed from an individual time series of 200 periods; the table presents averages
over 20,000 consumers.26 We also report the nondurable to durable consumption ratio, av-
erage normalized wealth (deﬁned as the sum of ﬁnancial and physical assets), percentage of
voluntary equity over total wealth, and the proportion of time individuals are constrained.
Panel A focuses in the no-adjustment cost case and Panel B on the adjustment cost case.
possibility was introduced, the model may be able to account for the excesses for lower down payment
parameters.
25In our simulations, the volatility of income is kept constant so the excess smoothness coeﬃcient can
be used to compare absolute volatilities of consumption growth rates for diﬀerent down payment regimes.
26We simulate 250 periods but we ignore the ﬁrst 50 to insulate the results from the inﬂuence of initial
conditions. Normalized cash-on-hand converges to a stationary distribution quickly, about 12 to 15 periods
starting from zero assets.
15Several patterns are worth stressing.
[Table 1]
No Adjustment Costs
We start with the no-adjustment cost case. First, note that with θ equal to the user cost
of the durable—roughly 10 percent for our calibration—the constraint does not aﬀect the
intratemporal allocation between the durable and the nondurable. The agent spends ﬁxed
proportions of his cash-on-hand on both goods and consequently all reported statistics
are identical for both goods. Second, observe that as the down payment increases, the
average nondurable to durable ratio goes up since buying the durable good is more costly
in terms of current liquidity. Also, the agent carries more total wealth but less voluntary
equity since the durable is liquid and can be sold to free required equity without cost when
necessary. In fact, for down payments higher than 30 percent, consumers hold no voluntary
equity.
With respect to nondurable consumption, we observe that both consumption growth
and its volatility decreases monotonically with increasing down payments. Moreover,
agents can smooth nondurable consumption considerably for all possible down payments
(the smoothness coeﬃcient is well below 60 percent for down payments of 20 percent or
higher). Durable consumption growth is also smoother than income. However, durable
consumption growth and its volatility are non-monotonic in θ, increasing with θ ﬁrst and
then decreasing.
There are two channels which explain the decrease in the volatility of nondurable con-
sumption growth with increasing down payments. The ﬁrst channel operates through
the increase in total wealth: more wealth means agents have more resources available to
smooth transitory income shocks. The second channel relates to the fact that when down
payments are high, agents spread out the accumulation or liquidation of required wealth
holdings in response to income shocks. For example, if there is an above-average perma-
nent income shock, the agent’s new equilibrium level of durable consumption increases.
This higher level of durable consumption, however, requires more wealth holdings in the
form of the required down payment. Instead of increasing required wealth immediately to
its equilibrium level, the agent accumulates the new down payment requirement over time
so that nondurable consumption does not suﬀer temporarily. As θ increases, the burden
imposed by the down payment increases resulting in more smoothing of the required down
payment.
16To be precise, if agents were only subject to permanent shocks, the degree of smoothing
would be controlled by whether the down payment requirement is greater than, less than,
or equal to the user cost of the durable, (R−ψ)/R. The user cost can be thought of as the
durable’s long-run price in terms of the agent’s intertemporal budget constraint. When
the constraint binds, the short-run cost of the durable is eﬀectively θ, the cost of a unit
of durable consumption in terms of foregone nondurable consumption. When the prices
are equal and the agent is constrained, the wealth requirement imposes a cost (in terms of
foregone nondurable consumption) that is the same as the user cost. This sends a signal to
the agent to adjust fully to the new equilibrium level of durable consumption. When the
short-run cost of the durable is greater than its long-run cost (when θ>(R − ψ)/R), the
agent gradually adjusts to the new equilibrium level of durable consumption over several
periods. A full adjustment would impose too great a sacriﬁce of nondurable consumption
relative to the unconstrained situation. When the short-run cost is lower than the long-
run cost, the agent faces favorable credit conditions and consumption growth overshoots
income growth. Figure 3 illustrates this point. It depicts consumption and income growth
for an agent who receives average income shocks every period except for period 0, when
he receives an above average permanent income shock. We consider three diﬀerent down
payments: 5, 10 and 30 percent. For the low down payment—which is below the user
cost—consumption growth overshoots income growth. For the 10 percent down payment,
consumption growth reacts one-to-one to income growth. For the high down payment,
smoothing takes place.
[Figure 3]
The eﬀect of burdensome down payments on durable consumption growth is analo-
gous to the eﬀect on nondurable consumption growth: higher down payments result in
smoother durable growth. The non-monotonicity in durable volatility comes from the
durable’s role as a store of wealth. If an agent faces a transitory negative income shock,
after voluntary equity runs out, required equity holdings are liquidated and used to smooth
nondurable consumption. As θ increases, the agent carries less voluntary equity resulting
in more occasions when durable consumption is reduced to convert required wealth into
nondurable consumption. One may expect, then, to observe less smoothing of the durable
as θ increases. However, this is not the case for the entire range of θ. Eventually, durable
consumption growth becomes smoother as the down payment increases. This is because
for high values of θ, the amount of forced saving is so high that the eﬃciency of trans-
forming required wealth holdings into nondurable consumption increases and requires a
17less dramatic reduction in durable consumption. Since the wealth requirement is propor-
tional to the durable stock, doubling the wealth requirement implies halving the amount of
durable consumption reduction necessary to yield a given amount of liquid resources. This
eﬀect allows the agent to liquidate more wealth without as great a reduction in durable
consumption. As a consequence, the volatility of durable consumption starts to fall again
as the down payment requirement gets higher.
Table 1 also shows that excess smoothness of consumption growth is not associated with
robust excess sensitivity. The speciﬁcation for individual income growth—an MA(1)—
implies a negative correlation between consumption growth and lagged income growth
(a high innovation now signals low income growth next period), but as down payments
become more burdensome, the sluggish response of consumption to permanent income
changes generates a positive correlation. For high down payments, the eﬀects cancel out
resulting in no excess sensitivity.27 Finally, we emphasize that even if nondurable con-
sumption volatility increases when down payments decrease, agents are better oﬀ under
the more favorable credit conditions. In fact, nondurable consumption growth increases
with decreases in θ.
Adjustment Costs
With adjustment costs, things are just slightly more complicated. Agents change the
durable stock infrequently in order to minimize the transaction cost. Just as in the no-
adjustment cost case, consumers save as they anticipate the down payment requirement
needed to change the durable stock. They also engage in additional minimal savings to
pay for the adjustment cost. This is done very close to the period of adjustment. Figure 4
depicts a simulation in which an individual receives average income shocks for a number
of periods using a down payment of 30 percent. The graph shows normalized durable
and nondurable consumption, and voluntary equity. In the no-adjustment cost case the
agent keeps c and k constant and carries no voluntary equity. In the adjustment cost
case, k follows an (S,s) rule. Even small adjustments are costly, so agents let durables
depreciate until the s trigger is reached and adjustment takes place. Note that agents build
up voluntary equity close to the period of adjustment, and that nondurable consumption,
while relatively smooth, suﬀers slightly during the adjustment period.
27The empirical evidence with respect to excess sensitivity at the individual level is mixed. While Hall
and Mishkin (1982) ﬁnd a negative correlation between consumption growth and lagged income growth,
Attanasio and Weber (1995) argue that after accounting for changes in household composition and labor
supply there is no evidence of excess sensitivity in U.S. micro data.
18[Figure 4]
Table 1 (Panel B) shows that the C-K ratio is higher with adjustment costs since
the durable good is less attractive. Also, while wealth increases with the down payment,
just as in the no-adjustment cost case, voluntary equity does not go all the way down to
zero. It is now costly to sell the durable to free required equity so agents try to avoid
this situation by keeping a small liquid buﬀer-stock. Just as in the no-adjustment cost
case, nondurable consumption growth volatility decreases with increasing down payments,
while the volatility of durable consumption growth is non-monotonic for the same reasons.
However, durable consumption growth is now more volatile than income growth. This is
due to the optimal (S,s) adjustment rule for the durable. In the inaction region, the durable
growth rate is equal to minus the depreciation rate, while during the year of adjustment
durable consumption growth is quite substantial (see Figure 5). Nondurable consumption
growth is still smoother than income growth, although smoothing is slightly less eﬀective




The main question in this paper is whether our model can account for the macroeconomic
stylized facts of excess sensitivity and excess smoothness of nondurable consumption. We
explore the aggregate implications of the model next. First, we present the relevant statis-
tics for U.S. aggregate data in Table 2, and then compare them to the numbers generated
by our model reported in Table 3.
The Aggregate Excesses in the Data
We obtain annual U.S. aggregate data from the BEA for the period 1959–2001. All ﬂow
series come from NIPA and all stock series from FADC. We use the following variables:
disposable labor income, consumption expenditure on nondurables and services (with and
without housing services and expenditure on clothing and shoes), and the stock of non-
residential durables and residences. Disposable labor income is calculated from several
NIPA components.28 All series are per capita and deﬂated by their corresponding chain-
28Speciﬁcally, disposable labor income is the sum of wages and salaries plus other labor income, minus
personal contributions for social insurance and taxes. Taxes are deﬁned as the fraction of wage and salary
income in total income, times personal tax and non tax payments.
19type price deﬂator. Income is deﬂated by the personal consumption expenditure deﬂator.
The excess smoothness coeﬃcient is the ratio of consumption growth to income growth,
and the excess sensitivity coeﬃcient comes from the OLS regression of consumption growth
on lagged income growth.
[Table 2]
Table 2 shows the excesses coeﬃcients for each consumption series.29 Note that all
consumption variables exhibit smoothness relative to income except for the non-residential
durable stock. Moreover, they all exhibit excess sensitivity. In the data, K is smoother
than C and the excess sensitivity coeﬃcient is higher for K than for C. The aggregates
that best match our model are nondurable expenditure plus services minus housing services
for C, and the residential stock plus the non-residential durable stock for K.30 For these
aggregates, the excess sensitivity coeﬃcients are 0.16 for the nondurable and 0.26 for the
durable. The excess smoothness ratios are 0.67 for the nondurable and 0.42 for the durable.
The Aggregate Excesses in the Model
Can our model reproduce these numbers? In order to determine the macroeconomic
implications of the model, we explicitly aggregate over consumers who behave according to
it. We generate idiosyncratic and aggregate labor income shocks from the assumed income
distributions for 2,000 consumers during 200 periods. Given the calculated individual op-
timal consumption rules, we use the generated shocks to simulate nondurable and durable
consumption for each consumer. Aggregate consumption and aggregate income in a given
period are calculated as averages of consumption and income across individuals.31 Then,
the relevant statistics (i.e., the excess smoothness ratio, the excess sensitivity coeﬃcient,
etc.) are calculated using the aggregate time series. The procedure is repeated for 100
independent simulations. Table 3 presents averages across the 100 simulations of the rele-
vant statistics. Panel A focuses on the no-adjustment cost case while panel B focuses on
the adjustment cost case.
[Table 3]
29We acknowledge that referring to the excess sensitivity and excess smoothness of the durable is an abuse
of terminology, as these terms refer to the empirical evidence for the nondurable. We report analogous
coeﬃcients for the durable in order to provide an initial guideline of the ﬁt of our model to the durable as
well.
30In our speciﬁcation, services from housing are derived from K, not from C.
31We simulate 250 periods but the ﬁrst 50 periods are discarded to insulate results from initial conditions.
Using more 2,000 than consumers does not change the results.
20We start with the no-adjustment cost case. Note that with aggregation, idiosyncratic
shocks cancel out and what remains is the inﬂuence from the common shock, which is
permanent. Not surprisingly then, when the down payment parameter is equal to the user
cost, the model does not deliver either excess smoothness or excess sensitivity and the
results are similar to those of the standard buﬀer-stock model. Ludvigson and Michaelides
(2001), table 2, report an excess sensitivity coeﬃcient of 0.001 and an excess smoothness
value of 0.99 for our particular calibration, identical to ours. Moreover, when the down
payment is lower than the user cost the model generates excess volatility. For down pay-
ments higher than the user cost, we obtain robust excess smoothness and in some cases
excess sensitivity. As discussed in Section 4.1, agents choose not to adjust consumption
levels immediately when facing permanent income shocks if down payments are burden-
some, preferring to spread out the accumulation or liquidation of required wealth holdings.
The higher the down payment, the longer the adjustment process. Furthermore, excess
sensitivity appears because consumption optimally responds with a lag to changes in in-
come. Note that as in the data, K is smoother than C and its excess sensitivity coeﬃcient
is higher.
Table 3 also shows that excess smoothness increases monotonically with increases in
the down payment, but that excess sensitivity is non-monotonic. The best way to explain
the intuition behind this ﬁnding is through the following controlled experiment. Let us
simulate a representative individual who receives the aggregate income process.32 Let him
receive average income shocks all periods but period 0. Figure 6 depicts the paths for the
growth rates of nondurable and durable consumption for three diﬀerent down payments:
10, 30 and 100 percent. Durable and nondurable consumption growth rates do not fully
react to the change in income in period 0 for down payments higher than the user cost
value, 10 percent. The excess sensitivity coeﬃcient calculated in our simulations measures
the reaction of current consumption changes to changes in income in the previous period
only. Consider period 1 in the graph. Durable consumption growth is higher for θ =0 .3
than for θ = 1, so we obtain a lower excess sensitivity coeﬃcient for the higher down
payment in spite of consumption growth being smoother because of the longer adjustment
period.33
[Figure 6]
32With no adjustment costs, the results from our explicit aggregation and from the exercise that considers
a representative agent who receives the aggregate income process are very similar. We do not tabulate the
experiment here for brevity.
33This suggests that when measuring excess sensitivity this way, one should include more lags of income
growth in the speciﬁcation.
21Burdensome down payments can then qualitatively explain the existence of excess sen-
sitivity and excess smoothness of nondurable consumption. Quantitatively, for θ =0 .3t h e
smoothness ratio is 0.8; the sensitivity coeﬃcient 0.11. While these numbers are still far
from their empirical counterparts, they outperform the role of incomplete information—
Ludvigson and Michaelides (2001), table 3, report an excess sensitivity coeﬃcient of 0.104
and an excess smoothness ratio of 0.92.
With adjustment costs, the (S,s) rule used by agents to adjust durable stocks implies
that, unlike the no-adjustment cost case, consumption of an individual who receives ag-
gregate income shocks may not exhibit the same properties as aggregate consumption.
This is because agents adjust their durable stocks at diﬀerent times (as they reach their
speciﬁc triggers) when reacting to a common permanent shock. Thus, income shocks have
a longer lasting eﬀect on aggregate consumption. As a result, nondurable consumption
is smoother in the adjustment cost case. In fact, for a down payment of 30 percent, the
model can reproduce the actual excess sensitivity and smoothness observed in the data
for the nondurable. The excess sensitivity coeﬃcient in this case is 0.16, and the excess
smoothness coeﬃcient 0.67.
With adjustment costs, the durable also exhibits excess sensitivity and is smoother
than income for down payments higher than the user cost, which was not the case at the
individual level. At the aggregate level, durable consumption growth is smoother than
income growth because diﬀerent agents respond to the common permanent shocks at dif-
ferent times. In our baseline calibration, the durable is more volatile than the nondurable,
unlike what we observe in the data. However, this result is not general. For example, when
the transaction cost is 10 percent (see Table 4; φ =0 .1), aggregate durable consumption
growth is less volatile than nondurable consumption growth, in line with the data.34
Table 4 presents some further robustness analysis. We report excess smoothness and
excess sensitivity coeﬃcients for two down payments: 10 and 30 percent. The ﬁrst two rows
reproduce, for convenience, the results for the no-adjustment cost case and the adjustment
cost case respectively. The third row considers a higher adjustment cost (10 percent), and
the fourth row a lower depreciation rate for the durable, which implies a lower user cost.
The last two rows explore cases with slightly diﬀerent adjustment cost speciﬁcations. In
row (5), the transaction cost is divided between buyers and sellers (i.e. ζ(Kt,K t−1)=
φ1dψKt−1 + φ2dKt, φ1 = φ2 =0 .025). In row (6), the adjustment cost is paid by the
34This is because the higher the transaction cost, the less frequently consumers adjust their durable
holdings (and the fewer consumers reach their triggers at the same time), resulting in a smaller reaction
of durable consumption growth to current income growth.
22seller, as in our original speciﬁcation, but transaction costs are higher when investment is
negative than when investment is positive (7.5 percent versus 2.5 percent). This is to allow
for the possibility that some increases in the durable stock may be due to the purchase of
extra units as oppose to the replacement of old ones.
In all cases, some excess smoothness is observed even for the lower down payment rate
of 10 percent. For the 30 percent down payment, excess smoothness of the nondurable
is similar to that observed in the data. Excess sensitivity is also the norm. The durable
exhibits excess smoothness and excess sensitivity as well. Furthermore, the durable is
smoother than the nondurable good as in the data. However, to match the empirical
ﬁgures for durables, higher down payments are necessary.
[Table 4]
In summary, our model provides a plausible explanation for the results of excess sensi-
tivity and excess smoothness of nondurable consumption in aggregate data. Consumption
optimally responds with a lag to changes in income as consumers spread out the burden
of down payments over several periods. With non-convex adjustment costs, we ﬁnd an
even more prolonged adjustment in the aggregate resulting in higher excess sensitivity and
excess smoothness for nondurable consumption growth. In order to quantitatively match
the excesses, we need a high enough down payment relative to the user cost. We do not
argue that this is the only possible explanation for these so-called consumption excesses
but one that should not be overlooked.
5 Conclusions
This paper studies a buﬀer-stock model of saving where agents consume both durable and
nondurable goods, and face a minimum net worth constraint. This constraint captures the
idea that durables serve as collateral. Furthermore, we consider variations of the model
with and without adjustment costs in the durable market. We show that the constraint
can alter the allocation of resources between the durable and the nondurable and has
implications for the volatility of the two goods. Indeed, only when the down payment
requirement exactly equals the user cost of the durable and there are no transaction costs
should we study durables and nondurables separately.
We ﬁnd that for an individual, nondurable consumption growth unambiguously be-
comes more volatile relative to income when the required down payment for purchases of
durables in an economy is lowered. Moreover, this result is preserved by aggregation. For
23the durable, the results are slightly more complex, and while some non-monotonicities exist
at the individual level with respect to volatility, aggregate durable consumption growth
is also more volatile for lower down payments. For an individual, this result is explained
in part by the fact that higher down payment requirements translate into higher wealth
holdings to deal with negative transitory income shocks—since down payments act as a
form of forced saving—and in part by the fact that consumers choose to gradually adjust
their consumption when facing permanent income shocks in order to spread out the burden
of the down payment. At the aggregate level, it is only this last eﬀect that survives. More-
over, this gradualism or sluggish response of consumption to permanent income shocks
generates robust excess smoothness and excess sensitivity in an explicit aggregation of the
model for plausible parameter values. The model with adjustment costs can match the
empirical evidence for nondurable consumption.
Another interesting implication of the model is that decreases in down payments and
transaction costs reduce average wealth. For example, reducing the down payment from
30 to 20 percent decreases average wealth holdings by over 30 percent (see Table 3). For
a down payment of 30 percent, eliminating the adjustment cost reduces average wealth
holdings by 10 percent. Diﬀerences in the durables market may play an important role in
explaining diﬀerences in saving rates across countries or even the decrease in the saving
rate in the U.S. in last few decades. This question, however, is better addressed in a general
equilibrium setting.
We stress that lower down payment requirements imply that households voluntarily
lower wealth holdings (because of their impatience) and voluntarily accept the cost of
greater volatility. In this model, ceteris paribus, consumers should be better-oﬀ in an
economy with lower down payments.
Several factors not included in the model may further reﬁne the results of this paper
and deserve attention for future research. First, some consumers may simply give up saving
for down payments if the cost is too prohibitive. An interesting extension to the current
model would be to allow for this phenomenon which would require the explicit presence of
a rental market. Second, the model would beneﬁt from the inclusion of stochastic durable
prices and its extension to a general equilibrium setting.35
35In a related paper, D´ ıaz and Luengo-Prado (2002) ﬁnd that decreasing down payments or transaction
costs lead to slightly higher real interest rates in general equilibrium. The increase in the interest rate
(which increases the user cost) is not big enough to overturn the results in this paper.
24A Appendix A. Numerical Procedures
A.1 Euler Equation Iteration
Derivation of key equations (10) and (11)
Using our particular utility speciﬁcation, we can write equations (5) and (6), the Euler-
Lagrange necessary conditions, as follows:
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+ λt =0 , (5 )
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− θλt =0 . (6 )
As in Carroll (1997), we rewrite the equations in ratio terms by taking advantage of the
homogeneity of degree ρ of marginal utility and dividing all variables by permanent income:
−c
−ρ







t =0 , (5  )
ϕk
−ρ













−1[R(xt − ct)+( ψ − R)kt]+Vt+1,
ct ≡ Ct/Pt and kt ≡ Kt/Pt.
When the agent is not liquidity constrained, λt = 0. Moreover, as we know from the
intratemporal condition, ct/kt = Ω. Using these facts and the deﬁnition of xt+1 above,


























t =0 . (10)
When the agent is constrained, xt = ct +θkt. Also, we can solve for λtP
ρ
t in equation (5  ).
Substituting into equation(6  ), we can write:





















With the two equations above, we can ﬁnd the optimal rule for normalized nondurable
consumption as a function of the unique state variable, normalized cash-on-hand, x.W e
denote the optimal rule as c(x). Euler equation iteration requires assuming a ﬁnite horizon,
T, and recursively solving backwards from the last period of life. To apply the method
successfully, we need to (i) evaluate the expectation, (ii) select an appropriate terminal
condition and (iii) ﬁnd a criterion to check if the agent is constrained.
In order to evaluate the expectation, we avoid numerical integration by replacing the
continuous Gt, Nt and Tt processes by 5-point discrete approximations as suggested by
Tauchen (1986). With regards to the terminal condition, we assume that, as in Deaton
(1992), the value of total assets is zero at time T, aT +kT =0 . Then cT(x)=x (the agent
spends all his cash-on-hand on the nondurable).
In period T − 1, for a given value of x, we can numerically compute the value cT−1
that satisﬁes the appropriate equation: the ﬁrst one if the agent is not constrained and
the second one if he is. We do so for a grid of values of x and numerically approximate
the optimal consumption rule cT−1(x) through interpolation between the points of the x
grid (we use cubic spline interpolation). Once we have cT−1(x), the same grid of x values
is used to compute cT−2(x). With cT−2(x), cT−3(x) is computed, and so on.
Note that there is a shortcut to verify if the agent is constrained for a given value of x.
At each time iteration, ﬁnd x∗
t(θ), the exact value of cash-on-hand for which the liquidity






t(θ)). This implies that ct(x∗
t(θ)) = Ω(Ω + θ)−1x∗
t(θ).
Then we can just solve equation (10) for x∗
t(θ). For all x ≤ x∗
t(θ) the agent is constrained,
and vice versa.
Once we have the optimal policy function for the nondurable, c(x), the optimal policy
function for the durable, k(x), can be calculated by using the intratemporal relationship





θ−1[x − c(x)],x ≤ x∗(θ),
Ω−1c(x),x > x ∗(θ).
Convergence Conditions
Two suﬃcient conditions for the individual Euler equations (5) and (6) to deﬁne a con-
traction mapping for {c(x),k(x)} are the conditions in Theorem 1 of Deaton and Laroque
(1992). In our case:
βREt[(Gt+1Nt+1)
−ρ] < 1, (15)
β(R − ψ)Et[(Gt+1Nt+1)
−ρ] < 1. (16)
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Equation (17) is the “impatience” condition derived by Deaton (1991) with µN =0 .
This condition ensures that borrowing is part of the unconstrained plan. For equation (18)
to be satisﬁed, R>ψ . Moreover, as long as 0 <R−ψ<1, condition (17) is stricter than
condition (18). Brieﬂy, for 0 <R− ψ<1, the standard impatience condition common to
buﬀer-stock models guarantees convergence. For R−ψ>1, convergence is guaranteed by
condition (18). For R<ψ , convergence is not guaranteed.
A.2 Finite State Approximation
The technique consists of specifying a ﬁnite-state problem that approximates the con-
tinuous one we want to solve. We replace the continuous state variables, k and q,w i t ht h e
ﬁnite sets, K = {k1,...,k Nk} and Q = {q1,...,q Nq}. Note that the problem has been con-
veniently formulated in such a way that the control variables are the next period’s states.
The liquidity constraint is implemented by setting q1 =0a n dqi > 0,∀qi ∈Q ,i>1. To
deal with adjustment cost, we set:
27d =
 
0, |kt − (GtNt)−1ψkt−1|≤κ,
1, |kt − (GtNt)−1ψkt−1| >κ ,
where κ =( kn − kl)/(Nk − 1). The precision of our solution increases as κ falls. This
“work around” solution may have some economic signiﬁcance. It may be possible for the
agent to make small changes to his durable stock, such as repairs, which do not require
signiﬁcant adjustment costs. If this is the case, the numerical formulation described here
would be most appropriate.
As with the previous technique, all components of the income process are discretized.
NG points for G, NN points for N,a n dNT points for the transitory shock T.W et h e nu s e
value function iteration, which is sped up with an acceleration technique, modiﬁed policy
function iteration with S states.36 Brieﬂy,
1. Choose an initial guess V 0.L e tV   = V 0.
2. Calculate U +1 = UV  .F o re a c h( qi,k j), the mapping U is deﬁned as:
U
 +1







Rqi +[ ψ(1 − dφ) − R(1 − θ)]kj
 
−θk














































Set V  +1 = W S.
4. Iterate until convergence.
Note that the selection of appropriate bounds for the sets K and Q is key for the success-
ful application of the technique. See Farr and Luengo-Prado (1999) for more information
about this method.
36Every time a new policy function is computed, we calculate the value function that would result from
using this policy function S times. With the newly obtained value function, we compute the new optimal
policy function and so on. See Judd (1997) for a general description of these procedures.
28For the construction of Table 3, we set NG = NN = NV =5 ;Nk = 150, k1 =0 .01 and
kNk =2 .5; Nq = 70, q1=0 and qNq =0 .3 for θ ∈ [0,0.4]; Nq = 90, q1=0 and qNq =0 .4 for
θ =0 .5; Nq = 110, q1=0 and qNq =0 .5 for θ =1 ;
A.3 Comparing Techniques
We solve the problem without adjustment costs for a few parameter values with both
techniques. Results are shown in Table 5. All statistics are fairly similar, which suggests
that the ﬁnite state approximation technique produces reasonable results. With regards to
computational time, the procedures rank very diﬀerently. Convergence of a policy function
using Euler equation iteration (EEI) takes between 25 and 40 iterations and a total time
of 0.45 minutes. A typical simulation takes 0.8 minutes. Convergence of policy functions
using the ﬁnite state approximation (FSA) takes between 10 and 12 iterations and 35
minutes. A typical simulation takes 0.7 minutes.37 EEI is a faster procedure but it cannot
be used when introducing adjustment costs. Moreover, it must be tailored to deal with
other speciﬁcations of utility functions and its implementation may not be feasible in all
cases. FSA is a more robust method. It can easily accommodate adjustment costs and
diﬀerent utility speciﬁcations.
[Table 5]
Appendix B. Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1
We know from the intratemporal ﬁrst order condition of the problem that the ratio
of nondurable to durable consumption equals Ω, regardless of the value of θ.M o r e o v e r
xt = ct + θkt + qt. Both conditions imply the results.
Proof of Proposition 2
(A) If θ =0 ,xt = ct + qt. When the agent is constrained, qt =0s oc(x)=x. k(x)
does not depend on x in this case since it does not impose any cost on current
liquidity. Note that k provides utility today but decreases cash-on-hand tomorrow
(ψ<R ). Therefore, there is an optimal level of k while x is below x∗(θ). Given that
k(x)=Ω −1 (x − q) for x ≥ x∗(θ), k(x)=Ω −1x∗(θ) for x<x ∗(θ).
37All programs are in C++. Calculations were performed using an Intel Xeon 2.8 GHz processor.
29(B) Since the agent is liquidity constrained, x = c(x)+θk(x). Then, 1 = c (x)+θk (x),
0=c  (x)+θk  (x), with c (x) > 0a n dk (x) > 0, and c(0) = k(0) = 0. From the
intratemporal ﬁrst order condition we know that:
c(x∗(θ))
k(x∗(θ))





The closer x to x∗(θ), the lower the shadow price of the constraint. Therefore the c-k
ratio increases with x. The only way this can happen is with c  (x) > 0a n dk  (x) < 0.
Hence c(x)m u s tb ec o n v e xa n dk(x) concave while the agent is constrained.
(C) We observe from the intratemporal ﬁrst order condition that in this case, the agent
is able to keep the c-k ratio constant and equal to Ω. Moreover c(x)+θk(x)=x.
Both conditions imply the result.
(D) The proof is similar to (B).I nt h i sc a s e ,t h ec-k ratio is higher than Ω when the
agent is constrained and decreases towards Ω as x approaches x∗(θ). The only way
this can happen is with a concave c(x)a n dac o n v e xk(x).
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34Table 1: Microeconomic Results from Individual Time Series
θ 0.0 0.05 ∼ 0.1♦ 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.0
Panel A. No Adjustment Costs
Avg. gC (%) 2.49 2.45 2.38 2.27 2.21 2.17 2.15 2.11
gC smoothness 0.88 0.83 0.76 0.63 0.54 0.47 0.43 0.36
(0.039) (0.033) (0.025) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017)
gC sensitivity -0.171∗ -0.167∗ -0.141∗ -0.085 -0.038 -0.008 0.004 0.014
(0.061) (0.058) (0.053) (0.045) (0.038) (0.034) (0.031) (0.026)
Avg. gK (%) 2.22 2.29 2.38 2.45 2.39 2.29 2.23 2.11
gK smoothness 0.56 0.65 0.76 0.84 0.78 0.66 0.57 0.35
(0.024) (0.022) (0.025) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015)
gK sensitivity -0.053 -0.106∗ -0.141∗ -0.136∗ -0.077 -0.018 0.009 0.034
(0.040) (0.046) (0.053) (0.059) (0.055) (0.047) (0.041) (0.025)
C-K ratio 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.38 0.39 0.40 0.45
Avg. wealth 0.03 0.13 0.24 0.43 0.63 0.82 1.00 1.82
Avg. q (%) 100.0 17.4 7.2 1.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
Constrained (%) 40.9 43.1 52.2 72.7 91.1 98.5 99.8 100.0
Panel B. Adjustment Costs
Avg. gC (%) 2.47 2.45 2.43 2.39 2.34 2.32 2.29 2.25
gC smoothness 0.86 0.85 0.83 0.78 0.73 0.71 0.67 0.60
(0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.043) (0.038)
gC sensitivity -0.161∗ -0.153∗ -0.135∗ -0.080 -0.030 0.015 0.038 0.068
(0.060) (0.059) (0.058) (0.055) (0.052) (0.050) (0.048) (0.043)
Avg. gK (%) 4.63 4.70 4.76 4.71 4.52 4.28 4.07 3.35
gK smoothness 2.37 2.41 2.45 2.42 2.31 2.16 2.04 1.57
(0.130) (0.135) (0.139) (0.136) (0.127) (0.117) (0.110) (0.083)
gK sensitivity -0.042 0.004 0.060 0.117 0.118 0.108 0.084 0.098
(0.169) (0.172) (0.174) (0.172) (0.164) (0.154) (0.145) (0.112)
C-K ratio 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.40 0.41 0.43 0.44 0.49
Avg. wealth 0.03 0.13 0.24 0.45 0.66 0.86 1.05 1.86
Avg. q (%) 100.0 20.2 12.9 10.9 10.9 10.9 10.9 9.7
Constrained (%) 43.1 44.2 43.5 40.9 38.0 34.8 31.8 30.7
Notes: gC and gK are the growth rate of nondurable consumption and durable consumption respectively. The
rows labelled “smoothness” report the ratio of the standard deviation of (nondurable or durable) consumption
growth to the standard deviation of income growth. The rows labelled “sensitivity” report the OLS coeﬃcient
from a regression of consumption growth on lagged income growth and a constant. The row labelled “avg.
wealth” presents normalized wealth, the sum of ﬁnancial wealth plus durable wealth divided by permanent
income (a + k). q is normalized voluntary equity, the wealth held in excess of the required down payment.
The row labelled “avg. q (%)” is the percentage of voluntary equity on total wealth. In all cases, R =1 .02,
ψ =0 .915, ϕ =0 .795, β =1 /1.05 and ρ =2 . φ =0 .05 in the adjustment cost case. The parameters
for the diﬀerent income shocks are: µG =0 .02, σG =0 .025, µN = µT =0 ,σN =0 .05, and σT =0 .07.
These imply a growth rate for labor income of 2.63 percent and a standard deviation of 11.07 per cent. The
statistics reported are calculated from an individual time series of 200 periods; the table shows averages
over 20,000 individuals. In parentheses, we report the standard deviation of the smoothness ratio across the
20,000 individuals, as well as the average standard error of the regression coeﬃcient of the excess sensitivity
parameter.
♦ down payment equal to user cost.
* signiﬁcant at 5%.








nondurables+services-shoes and clothing 0.60 0.21
(2.30)
nondurables+services-housing-shoes and clothing 0.67 0.18
(1.71)
K
non-residential durable stock 0.98 0.66
(5.78)
residential durable stock 0.36 0.19
(3.78)
non-residential+residential stock 0.42 0.26
(4.93)
Notes: Excess Smoothness is measured as the ratio of the standard deviation of consump-
tion growth to the standard deviation of the income growth. Excess Sensitivity refers to
the OLS coeﬃcient from a regression of consumption growth on lagged income growth
and a constant (t-statistic in parentheses). All ﬂow series are from the National Prod-
uct and Income Accounts and all stock series from Fixed Assets and Consumer Durable
Goods Accounts published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. All series are per capita
and appropriately deﬂated.
36Table 3: Macroeconomic Results from Aggregate Time Series
θ 0.0 0.05 ∼ 0.1♦ 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 1.0
Panel A. No Adjustment Costs
Avg. gC (%) 2.18 2.17 2.17 2.16 2.16 2.16 2.16 2.15
gC smoothness 1.16 1.07 0.99 0.87 0.80 0.76 0.73 0.65
(0.009) (0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
gC sensitivity -0.116 -0.061 0.001 0.079 0.112∗ 0.113∗ 0.106∗ 0.076
(0.082) (0.076) (0.017) (0.062) (0.056) (0.053) (0.051) (0.046)
Avg. gK (%) 2.17 2.17 2.17 2.16 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.14
gK smoothness 1.04 1.04 0.99 0.82 0.66 0.56 0.50 0.35
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.011) (0.020) (0.026) (0.029) (0.033)
gK sensitivity -0.034 -0.039 0.001 0.121∗ 0.212∗ 0.239∗ 0.232∗ 0.169∗
(0.074) (0.074) (0.017) (0.058) (0.045) (0.036) (0.031) (0.022)
Avg. wealth 0.03 0.13 0.24 0.44 0.65 0.87 1.09 2.18
Avg. q (%) 100.0 17.6 7.2 1.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0
ϕ 0.74 0.77 0.80 0.84 0.89 0.94 0.89 1.25
Panel B. Adjustment Costs
Avg. gC (%) 2.17 2.17 2.16 2.16 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15
gC smoothness 1.06 0.99 0.91 0.78 0.67 0.60 0.56 0.47
(0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.021) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027)
gC sensitivity -0.063 -0.030 0.011 0.091 0.158∗ 0.196∗ 0.201∗ 0.160∗
(0.075) (0.070) (0.177) (0.055) (0.046) (0.040) (0.037) (0.044)
Avg. gK (%) 2.17 2.17 2.17 2.16 2.16 2.16 2.15 2.15
gK smoothness 1.05 1.00 0.94 0.86 0.80 0.74 0.67 0.48
(0.026) (0.029) (0.028) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.033) (0.031)
gK sensitivity 0.089 0.151∗ 0.213∗ 0.325∗ 0.380∗ 0.408∗ 0.363∗ 0.298∗
(0.074) (0.070) (0.065) (0.057) (0.050) (0.044) (0.040) (0.027)
Avg. wealth 0.03 0.13 0.25 0.48 0.72 0.96 1.20 2.34
Avg. q (%) 100.0 19.7 12.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 10.8 9.1
ϕ 0.9 0.95 1 1.1 1.2 1.25 1.3 1.6
Notes: gC and gK are the growth rate of nondurable consumption and durable consumption respectively. The
rows labelled “smoothness” report the ratio of the standard deviation of (nondurable or durable) consumption
growth to the standard deviation of income growth. The rows labelled “sensitivity” report the OLS coeﬃcient
from a regression of consumption growth on lagged income growth and a constant. The row labelled “avg.
wealth” presents normalized wealth, the sum of ﬁnancial wealth plus durable wealth divided by permanent
income (a + k). q is normalized voluntary equity, the wealth held in excess of the required down payment.
The row labelled “avg. q (%)” is the percentage of voluntary equity on total wealth. In all cases, R =1 .02,
ψ =0 .915, β =1 /1.05 and ρ =2 . φ =0 .05 in the adjustment cost case. The parameters for the diﬀerent
income shocks are: µG =0 .02, σG =0 .025, µN = µT =0 ,σN =0 .05, and σT =0 .07. These imply a growth
rate for income of 2.17 percent and a standard deviation of 2.5 per cent. ϕ, the preference parameter for
durable goods, is allowed to vary with θ to keep the C-K ratio constant and equal to 0.36. The statistics
reported are calculated from an aggregate time series of 200 periods. Aggregate consumption and income are
calculated as averages over 2,000 individuals. We report average statistics for 100 independent simulations.
In parentheses, we present the standard deviation of the smoothness ratio across the 100 simulations, as well
as the average standard error of the regression coeﬃcient of the excess sensitivity parameter.
♦ down payment equal to user cost.
* signiﬁcant at 5% level.
37Table 4: Further Results from Aggregate Time Series
θ =0 .1 θ =0 .3
gC gK gC gK
Ex. sen Ex. sm. Ex. sen Ex. sm. Ex. sen Ex. sm. Ex. sen Ex. sm.
(1) φ = 0 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.99 0.11∗ 0.80 0.21∗ 0.66
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.06) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02)
(2) φ =0 .05 0.01 0.91 0.21∗ 0.94 0.16∗ 0.67 0.38∗ 0.80
(0.17) (0.01) (0.07) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04)
(3) φ =0 .1 0.00 0.92 0.30∗ 0.82 0.10∗ 0.68 0.43∗ 0.66
(0.07) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.05)
(4) Higher ψ 0.04 0.87 0.30∗ 0.77 0.08 0.71 0.38∗ 0.61
(0.06) (0.01) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
(5) Buyer-Seller 0.01 0.88 0.31∗ 0.87 0.11∗ 0.69 0.38∗ 0.67
(0.06) (0.01) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
(6) Seller>Buyer 0.10 0.82 0.19 0.91 0.14 0.69 0.27∗ 0.65
(0.12) (0.03) (0.13) (0.05) (0.10) (0.04) (0.09) (0.05)
Notes: gC and gK are the growth rate of nondurable consumption and durable consumption respectively. All
parameters as in Table 3, except the parameter being changed. For row (3), φ =0 .1; for row (4), ψ =0 .943, which
implies a depreciation rate of 5.7 percent; φ =0 .05. For row (5), we use an alternative adjustment cost speciﬁcation
with the transaction cost divided between buyer and seller: ζ(Kt,K t−1)=φ1dψKt−1+φ2dKt, with φ1 = φ2 =0 .025.
In row (6), the transaction cost is higher for negative investment than for positive investment (7.5 percent versus 2.5
percent).
* signiﬁcant at 5% level.
38Table 5: Comparison of Techniques.Results for the No-Adjustment Cost Model.
(Individual Level)
θ 0.05 ∼ 0.1♦ 0.3
EEI FSA EEI FSA EEI FSA
c avg. 0.7771 0.7771 0.7795 0.7792 0.7886 0.7886
sd. 0.0423 0.0424 0.0391 0.0392 0.0293 0.0294
gC avg. 0.0245 0.0245 0.0238 0.0238 0.0221 0.0221
sd. 0.0922 0.0924 0.0843 0.0841 0.0592 0.0594
smoothness 0.8334 0.8356 0.7619 0.7600 0.5352 0.5372
(0.0332) (0.0337) (0.0251) (0.0250) (0.0152) 0.0156
sensitivity -0.1667 -0.1670 -0.1412 -0.1350 -0.0380 -0.0378
(0.0582) (0.0584) (0.0534) (0.0533) (0.0380) (0.0382)
k avg. 2.1879 2.1879 2.1661 2.1688 2.0809 2.0809
sd. 0.0781 0.0787 0.1088 0.1082 0.1492 0.1495
gK avg. 0.0229 0.0229 0.0238 0.0238 0.0239 0.0239
sd. 0.0719 0.0722 0.0843 0.0842 0.0859 0.0860
smoothness 0.6499 0.6524 0.7619 0.7613 0.7759 0.7776
(0.0216) (0.0223) (0.0251) (0.0235) (0.0168) (0.0172)
sensitivity -0.1056 -0.1024 -0.1412 -0.1447 -0.0774 -0.0777
(0.0457) (0.0459) (0.0534) (0.0533) (0.0550) (0.0551)
C/K 0.3503 0.3549 0.3598 0.3593 0.3800 0.3800
Notes: θ is the down payment parameter. EEI stands for Euler equation iteration. FSA stands for
ﬁnite state approximation. k is normalized durable and c is normalized nondurable. gK and gC are
the growth rates of durable and nondurable consumption (in levels) respectively. C/K is the ratio of
nondurable to durable (in levels). ♦ denotes the value of the down payment equal to the user cost,
roughly 0.1. For all cases, R =1 .02, ψ =0 .915, β =1 /1.05, ρ =2 ,ϕ =0 .795. The income statistics
are as follows: µG =0 .02, σG =0 .025, µN = µV =0 ,σN =0 .05, and σV =0 .07. The statistics
reported are calculated from an individual time series of 200 periods; the table shows averages over
20,000 individuals. In parentheses, we report the standard deviation of the smoothness ratio across
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Figure 5: Individual Consumption and Income Growth Rates with Adjustment
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Figure 6: Explaining Smoothness and Sensitivity.
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